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Abstract. Institutional innovations in conflict management have received considerable academic attention
in the past decades.Yet few studies have considered the design of referendums in peace processes and the
role of popular mandates in catalysing negotiated settlements. Drawing evidence from divided societies,
particularly the contrasting cases of South Africa and Cyprus, the article points to the importance of
ratification sequence and early mandate referendums. Specifically, it demonstrates how mandate referen-
dums focusing initially on domestic constituencies enable leaders to pre-empt ethnic outbidding challenges
while concluding a peace agreement.An early ratification process could safeguard the peace process from
unavoidable reversals in public opinion, increase flexibility as to the timing of critical decisions and
maximise the credibility of leaders aiming for a negotiated settlement. The study of mandate referendums
has important implications for broader research on international mediations since it suggests mechanisms
by which political actors could ensure the ratification of significant treaties in global or regional politics.
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Introduction
Suppose that an opportunity arises for Israelis and Palestinians, the two Koreas or Colom-
bians to reach a settlement in their decades-old conflicts.Would holding a referendum be
useful in the ratification process? Should opposing constituencies in divided societies be
asked to ratify a peace agreement? The growing debate on referendums around the world
has prompted work across area studies (Butler & Ranney 1994; LeDuc 2003), yet few
scholars have focused on referendums in peace processes or post-conflict transitions
(Johansson 2009; Kersting 2009, 2010; Lee & MacGinty 2012). Likewise, most comprehen-
sive studies of comparative peace processes, ethnic outbidding, post-conflict democratisa-
tion, and federal or consociational transitions have only touched on peace referendums.
Worse yet, despite increasing global interest in direct democracy, international organisa-
tions and governments often design peace referendums without considering comparative
cases or relevant international expertise.
As governments and the international community are currently debating future refer-
endums in conflict-ridden societies, analysing the value of potential ratification processes is
important for the stability and legitimacy of peace-building operations. In a best-case
scenario, referendums could facilitate political transformation and become the litmus test
of a society’s capacity to overcome deep divisions and bring forward new political dynam-
ics. Successful referendums in SouthAfrica in 1992 and Northern Ireland in 1998 have been
viewed as facilitating the respective peace settlements by engaging broader segments of the
society in the peace process and limiting the role of violent opposition groups (Strauss 1993;
Guelke 1999;McGarry &O’Leary 2009).But referendums might also have unintended side
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effects and inflame already unstable ethnic relations as suggested in East Timor and
Kyrgyzstan. In the case of the 1999 referendum in EastTimor, Paris (2004: 219) criticises the
United Nations administration for organising a premature referendum on independence
before providing security on the ground.Thousands of EastTimorese were killed and about
400,000 displaced (Paris 2004: 219; Schulze 2001: 78), while in Kyrgyzstan the constitutional
referendum of 2010 led to an estimated 400–500 dead and about 100,000 Uzbek refugees
(Huskey & Hill 2011). Thus, premature and ‘wrongly’ designed referendums could inad-
vertently turn into conflict-inducing, rather than conflict-mitigating, opportunities.
Admittedly, referendums are not the only way of engaging the public in peace-building
or the sole ratification method. Putnam (1988: 436) argues in his seminal contribution on
diplomacy and domestic politics that ratification processes may include voting in parlia-
ments or (in)formal negotiations with bureaucratic agencies and interest groups. His work
provides a set of important theoretical tools with which to dissect international agreements,
but his insights have yet to be adapted to the study of referendums. Likewise, Tsebelis
(2002) recognises alternative ratification processes, but argues that referendums add one
more ‘veto player’ (the target population) in decision making and therefore make the status
quo more difficult to change. More importantly, Lijphart (2004) suggests that referendums
might serve as instruments of oppression against minorities. However, few studies have
critically examined this claim. Nor have scholars or practitioners made a serious attempt to
identify the linkages between alternative ratification processes and mediation outcomes in
peace processes.1
Research design
In a bid to fill the gap in the literature, the article focuses on referendums and the role of
institutions in peace mediations, emphasising two contrasting episodes of referendums in
South Africa and Cyprus. The article utilises the ‘least likely’ case study research design
applied to cases of successful or failed conflict transformation.A case study is described as
crucial when it is ‘least likely’ to fulfil a theoretical prediction yet does so, thereby going
against current theories (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). For instance, in the study of refer-
endums in peace processes, a crucial or deviant case study is one that seems unlikely to
follow a peaceful transformation, yet an enabling referendum design has provided the
catalyst to nudge it to the right direction. Deviant cases, according to Lijphart (1968: 2),
have considerable theoretical significance because of the light they can throw on the social
conditions of stable and effective democracy. Thus, crucial cases of successful referendums
are those which evidence high levels of ethnic polarisation prior to the referendum – as, for
instance, pre-apartheid South Africa – yet peacemakers have positively reversed their
nation’s fortunes, shaping a peaceful transition to a post-conflict environment (Strauss
1993; Guelke 1999; Ross 2009).
Conversely, another set of crucial cases are those where domestic conditions and inter-
national engagement have been highly promising, yet the mismanagement of the referen-
dum timing and design has led to a renewed stalemate. This article focuses on Cyprus as a
paradigmatic case. The European Union has emerged since the 1990s as the new and
promising actor in the island that could have used its power to ‘catalyse’ a peace settlement
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(Richmond 2005; Rumelili 2007; and Tocci 2007). For one thing, the EU could have pro-
vided the ideal forum to change public attitudes in the conflict, by creating a ‘win-win’
framework, which could subsequently set the stage for a settlement (Yesilada & Sozen
2002; Hadjipavlou 2007; Anastasiou 2008; Kaymak 2012). For another, the Cyprus conflict
was relatively peaceful preceding EU involvement, with almost zero casualties since 1974
(Doyle & Sambanis 2006: 257–281; Heraclides 2006). This fact would have been arguably
conducive for a peace settlement since, unlike pre-apartheid South Africa, a generation of
Cypriots has grown up with almost no direct exposure to violence. Still, despite these
promising circumstances, Cyprus remains divided following the failure of the Annan Plan
referendum in 2004.
Of course, there are crucial differences in the background conditions of Cyprus and
South Africa. What is most important in this comparative design is that the ‘most critical
differences’ in the level of external incentives, ethnic/racial polarisation and violence, could
have predicted a ‘yes’ vote in Cyprus and yet another pro-apartheid ‘no’ vote in South
Africa. Admittedly, there was a widespread perception in South Africa that a ‘no’ vote
would have had negative repercussions, leading to new waves of violence and international
sanctions. But for the most part, violence could have turned South Africans away from the
peace process as suggested, for instance, in Israel/Palestine (Kydd&Walter 2002).Lake and
Rothchild (1996) have argued that violence frequently initiates a vicious cycle of ethnic fear
and more violence while Galtung (1967) has questioned the ‘naivety’ of sanctions. Likewise,
in SouthAfrica, both De Klerk (1999) and his advisors in interviews with the author argued
that the fear of sanctions had very little effect on their decisions.2
An alternative explanation points to the ANC’s (African National Congress) moderate
policies (including carefully crafted statements at the time of the referendum), which
played a positive role in securing the ‘yes’ vote among South African whites (Butler &
Ranney 1994: 9; Strauss 1993). But as argued in this article, the ANC’s quiescence was
partly due to the design of the referendum, which allowed it enough manoeuvring space
to both reject in principle the white-only initiative and encourage voters to support De
Klerk. However, as the Cypriot experience suggests, it is questionable whether positive
actions across the ethnic divide alone could be a sufficient condition for a positive refer-
endum outcome. In the months preceding the 2004 referendum, the Turkish Cypriots
community engaged in impressive peace rallies. Such mobilisations could have arguably
influenced the ‘yes’ vote, especially among moderate AKEL voters. The nominally com-
munist AKEL had historically built a strong identity around the prospect of reunification
emphasising ‘common legacies’ with the Turkish Cypriots, particularly on the left. Its
identity orientation would have predicted a ‘yes’ decision, particularly if the referendums
were properly timed. Yet AKEL reversed its position and voted against the Annan
Plan in a shocking last-minute decision (Trimikliniotis 2006; Pericleous 2009; Kaymak
2012).
To what extent does the timing and design of the referendums explain the differences in
the South African and Cypriot peace processes? To answer this question, the article turns
to secondary and available primary sources, including legal documents, public opinion
surveys, parliamentary debates and interviews with key advisors of leaders in the peace
process, as well as individuals with privileged access to information. It also utilises com-
parative cases of referendums in other peace processes.3 Finally, based on the lessons that
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can be learned from the two case studies, it offers recommendations for the design, moni-
toring and implementation of peace referendums in general.
Mandate referendums
In a mandate referendum, a leader presents a general idea or a framework for a peace
arrangement to the public in an attempt to secure early approval for the nascent agreement,
thereby expediting a conditional or unconditional directive to finalise it. Such referendums
can help initiate a peace settlement by offering advice, direction, and more importantly, a
mandate to negotiating leaders. Although the literature in conflict resolution has long
emphasised timing (Zartman 1985, 2001), there has been little application of this concept to
the design of peace referendums. Through mandate referendums, leaders can better
prepare the public for a peace settlement, incorporate early feedback into the negotiations,
strengthen their credibility across ethnic antagonists and safeguard the peace process from
subsequent and often unavoidable reversals in public opinion.
Mandate referendums should not be seen as a panacea, particularly if leaders prioritise
personal or partisan gains over the peace process or if leaders are unwilling to take even
‘calculated risks’ for peace.Yet mandate referendums could provide visionary leaders more
flexibility in choosing the ‘ripe moment’ to move the peace process forward. More impor-
tantly, such referendums could be more effective if the leadership proposing them main-
tains its overall popularity (as in the case of De Klerk’s government) or if international
conditions are favourable (e.g., the period before accession to the EU for the two Cypriot
communities). If leaders wait until the completion of the negotiations, it might be too late
for their own popularity to be effective or for external incentives to work, as suggested by
the failed Cypriot referendum.
The South African experience
The SouthAfrican white-only referendum of March 1992 offers one of the best examples of
a pre-agreement mandate referendum. Given its apartheid origins, it has received little
attention from political scientists (for exceptions, see Strauss 1993; Kersting 2010; Sussman
2012) while its transferability to other settings has not yet been widely debated, even
though it legitimised and facilitated the end of one of the most repressive regimes in the
twentieth century. Interestingly, South Africans reached a peace settlement in their first
major attempt, unlike other deeply divided societies such as Cyprus where negotiations
have failed for decades despite systematic UN mediation attempts.The peaceful transition
from apartheid in South African has been described as a ‘miracle’ by experts in the field
(Guelke 1999; Waldmeir 1997; Sandal 2011), particularly given the fate of other white
‘settler’ societies in sub-SaharanAfrica, major economic disparities, as well as mutual fears
and grievances. In other words, South Africa, especially the timely political transformation
of its white community, fits Eckstein’s (1975) criteria of a ‘least likely’ case study of a
positive conflict outcome where institutional features, including mandate referendums,
played a decisive role.
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TheSouthAfrican referendumwas triggeredby aby-election inPotchefstroom,which led
to thedefeat ofDeKlerk’sNational Party and challengedhis authority as chief negotiator for
the white community. As in other divided societies facing peace negotiations, opponents
made every effort to de-legitimise his policies, stating that the ruling National Party did not
represent the nation and even branded deKlerk a traitor (Sussman 2012). In response,Klerk
considered general elections,but SouthAfrica’s electoral systemwould have privileged rural
areaswhere the opposition had an advantage amongwhite farmers.However,his opponents’
rhetoric emphasising the need for the nation to be properly represented in the negotiations,
alongwith a statement from thedeputy leader of the oppositionConservativeParty,DrFerdi
Hartzenberg, that his party could win a referendum, allowed De Klerk some space for
electoral manoeuvring.4 In the end, De Klerk responded by initiating a snap referendum,
arguing that a mandate was necessary and that the use of a referendum process would cause
the least disruption in the ongoing negotiations (De Klerk 1999).The mandate character of
the referendum also allowed the National Party more flexibility in re-wording the referen-
dum question (Kersting 2010), thereby taking advantage of recent public opinion polls.5 De
Klerk asked voters to reject or endorse his reform policies to negotiate an end to white
minority rule through talks with the black majority.
The referendum asked: ‘Do you support continuation of the reform process which the
State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through
negotiation?’ (Kersting 2010; De Klerk 1999: 232). Moreover, the referendum vote took
place in the context of the apartheid regime: blacks were not allowed to participate in the
ballot, nor were Indians or persons of mixed-race. De Klerk argued that the referendum
needed to be restricted to the white community which was the only one divided on the
necessity of reforms and said he would regard majority support as granting him a mandate
to sign ‘binding agreements’ in constitutional talks (Kersting 2010; De Klerk 1999: 232).
What makes the South African case particularly interesting is the ambiguity in having a
second referendum at the end of the negotiations. On this issue, De Klerk said in advance
that it would be meaningless to ask white voters to reauthorise such agreements unless the
final settlement was substantially different from that currently envisaged by his party
(Kersting 2010).
As Putnam (1988: 447; see also Raiffa 1982) argues, issue linkage is extremely important
in a two-level negotiation process, particularly in altering feasible negotiation outcomes.De
Klerk linked the referendum to peace in general and to his own personal fate and political
future more specifically. He promised to resign and hold elections if his proposed reforms
failed to win a significant majority. His threat targeted, on the one hand, the South African
moderates and business leaders who feared a return to international isolation and black
revolt and, on the other hand, the ANC leadership who informally rallied behind his
campaign (Butler & Ranney 1994: 9).TheANC issued a statement saying that the referen-
dum benefited the negotiating process and emphasised that this should be the last occasion
on which South Africa was subject to the indignity of a racial or ethnic referendum.6 As
Mandela had no simultaneous referendum to run, he felt comfortable intervening in the
process, correcting the opposition’s misinformation campaign. For instance, to confront the
Conservative Party’s claim that a ‘yes’ vote was tantamount to ‘white suicide’, the ANC
leader reassured white farmers that: ‘President Robert Mugabe’s plans to nationalize farm
land in Zimbabwe had no bearing on the situation in SouthAfrica’ (Strauss 1993: 347).7
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De Klerk’s landslide victory included both rural Afrikaner communities and urban
English-speakers, surprising even his own party officials who had predicted a 55 per cent
‘yes’ majority, at best, well below the 68.7 per cent he received (Waldmeir 1992: 47).
Admittedly, in South Africa, the mandate referendum option was not unproblematic. De
Klerk later became more demanding in the negotiations while the ANC saw no reason to
help him to pacify a weakened right wing opposition (Waldmeir 1997: 184–185). Equally, at
the end of the negotiations, De Klerk was criticised for violating his promises in the
referendum, particularly with regards to white demand for power-sharing (Giliomee 2003).
Nonetheless, in the bigger picture, the referendum allowed the white community to make its
exit from apartheid with some grace (Giliomee 2003: 634) and transformed the image of the
‘other’ in South Africa’s racial relations, opening the door for mutual political accommo-
dation (Ross 2009). According to key advisors of De Klerk, the referendum boosted both
the confidence and legitimacy of his policies and determined without any doubt the ques-
tion of who represented the white community in South Africa.8 In a particularly colourful
image, one advisor described the period preceding the referendum as a ‘stagnant pool full
of crocodiles and malaria’, arguing that the plebiscite was a decisive move by De Klerk to
move ‘back to the river stream’ (Kersting 2010: 219).
The 1992 ‘yes’ vote added durability and institutional legitimacy to the post-apartheid
transition as well. Through his use of the referendum process, De Klerk delegitimised his
opponents and expanded his own domestic and international credibility. Despite his weak
negotiating position (having to negotiate under the threat of international sanctions and
domestic violence), De Klerk secured credible constitutional provisions for minority
groups and respect for property rights – key issues for the white constituencies (Waldmeir
1997: 243; Strauss 1993: 346). More importantly, the 1992 referendums created new cross-
cutting linkages, including a shared political vision of the future among supporters of the
‘yes’ vote which transcended ethnic and communal boundaries. De Klerk managed to keep
his party together from the day he removed the ban on the ANC until he agreed to hand
over power, thus bringing his constituency from the backwater of ethnic politics into the
modern world (Waldmeir 1997: 217). Even though demands for permanent power-sharing
were not included in the final settlement, the endorsement of De Klerk’s policy added an
element of responsibility among ANC elites; this later translated into creating a new
common symbolic landscape of racial relationships in South Africa while maintaining and
reinforcing the inclusion of whites withinANC and the governing structures of the country
(Ross 2009: 257).9
The 2004 failed Cypriot referendum
A contrasting case to SouthAfrica,Cyprus demonstrates the weaknesses of post-agreement
referendums. The island of Cyprus has remained de facto divided into Greek and Turkish
Cypriot controlled sections since 1974. Under the proposed 2002–2004 UN plan for reuni-
fication (‘the Annan Plan’), Greek and Turkish Cypriots would have retained autonomy
over most of their affairs under a decentralised federal system. Turkish Cypriots promised
to return land to Greek Cypriot displaced persons occupied by the Turkish military since
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1974 in exchange for power-sharing, EU membership and federal status within a reunited
Cyprus (Pericleous 2009; Sözen & Özersay 2007; Faustmann & Kaymak 2007).
The Annan Plan required multiple concessions from both sides. Greek Cypriots were
particularly concerned about the role of Turkey as a guarantor power and provisions for
the massive naturalisation of post-1974 Turkish settlers threatening the demographic com-
position of the island. But at the same time, Greek Cypriot moderates emphasised the
importance of major territorial concessions after the settlement; this included the cities
of Famagusta (Varosha) and Morphou,plus a large number of villages across the buffer
zone.
Voting rights in the referendums were determined by the communities themselves:
Greek Cypriots voted in the south while Turkish Cypriots voted simultaneously in the
north. Although the Annan Plan had the support of the two main Greek Cypriot political
parties (DISY and initially AKEL) representing two-thirds of the electorate, it was even-
tually rejected by a landslide 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots while 65 per cent of Turkish
Cypriots approved it during the twin April 2004 referendums.
In contrast to other deeply divided societies, both Cypriot communities were generally
seen as pro-settlement, particularly in light of EU accession, to the extent that UN diplo-
mats initiated the idea of a referendum that would not require the formal endorsement of
chief negotiators from each community.10 In 2004, UN mediators created a specific refer-
endum formula to bypass the intransigent former leader of theTurkish Cypriot community,
Rauf Denktas¸, and acting under the assumption that Greek Cypriots were unlikely to reject
the peace deal sinceAKEL and DISY had already signalled their tentative support for the
Annan Plan. In general, moderate Greek Cypriot leaders had argued in favour of a com-
promise, pointing out that each day without a settlement intensified the waves of coloni-
sation (from Turkey) and brought the occupied territories of Cyprus closer to ‘irreversible
partition’.They warned that the continuation of the status quo would allow Turkey and the
Turkish settlers to dominate the north while Turkish Cypriots would return to the South to
reclaim their properties and constitutional rights (Pericleous 2009).11
As Cyprus fits the criteria of a crucial case study, what explains the failure of the ‘likely
to succeed’ Cypriot referendum? Conventional wisdom assumes that referendums will fail
if the content of the peace agreement does not satisfy the most fundamental needs and fears
of the public.Yet peace agreements unavoidably contain undesirable provisions subject to
nationalist framing, and these are often intensified in contested referendums (Hancock
2011b; Ross 2009; Kaufman 1996). So, too, ratification attempts might fail because of the
nature and timing of the process (Putnam 1988; see also Kersting 2010; Kaymak 2012). For
instance, simultaneous post-agreement referendums among antagonistic communities
could be problematic as sides aim exclusively at their own constituencies, often successfully
framing their own gains from the negotiations while weakening the position of moderates
across the ethnic divide. Similar dilemmas apply to international mediators having to justify
positions that could harm one of the two communities during decisive moments in their
referendum campaigns.
To this Putnam adds the negative and positive aspects of preference restructuring and
reverberation during international negotiations.Any bargaining situation, he says, ‘involves
attempts by the players to restructure the game and to alter one another’s perceptions of
the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements’ (Putnam 1988: 454).
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Mandela’s assurances on property issues during the 1992 SouthAfrican referendum are an
example of positive reverberation across communal lines. Conversely, nationalist opposi-
tion to the Annan Plan in Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community caused Greek
Cypriots to fear that even the ‘few positive aspects of the Plan will not be implemented’.12
To this, the chairman of the ‘yes’ campaign in Northern Ireland, Quintin Oliver, adds that
sides in the conflict present diametrically opposed visions of what the agreement means to
their own constituencies, feeding each other’s negative propaganda.13 Simply stated,
mandate referendums could overcome this problem of negative reverberation if each side
could identify its ripe moment to win a mandate in its own community, thus minimising
negative input across the communal divide.
Cyprus also demonstrates that failed referendums can have long-term path-dependent
effects, preventing moderates from utilising constructive ideas previously rejected in a
popular referendum. Admittedly, mandate referendums are not immune to manipulation
and failure; any negotiating strategy could backfire if leaders nurture unrealistic expecta-
tions about forthcoming international negotiations. Or spoilers might seek a mandate to
prolong a conflict and deny concessions to out-groups, as Bosnian Serb leaders did in 1994;
yet such nationalist mandate referendums could count very little in international politics
(particularly if condemned early) as suggested by the subsequent Dayton peace process in
Bosnia.
These points highlight the broader advantages of De Klerk-style mandate referendums
for other divided societies. To begin, mandate referendums are less risky or damaging for
the peace process. If politicians lose their mandate, they could opt to step down without
sacrificing the essence of the peace process.Additionally, popular directives allow commu-
nities to prepare themselves for peace negotiations; they can provide leaders with feedback
and indicate the priorities to be addressed. Moreover, assigning a mandate to an elected
leader balances democratic accountability with pragmatism in negotiations: thus, as implied
by Putnam’s analysis, De Klerk was able to negotiate a credible end to apartheid without
fearing a risky referendum at the end of the process.Meanwhile,Greek andTurkish Cypriot
negotiators had to factor into their cost/benefit calculations the possibility that one of the
sides would renege from the agreement at some point in the future. More importantly, by
restricting any mandate for later renegotiation, the Annan Plan allowed propaganda to
dominate on issues that could have very easily been clarified in any subsequent version – for
instance, on the status and territorial waters of the British bases. Finally, mandate referen-
dums improve leaders’ negotiating strategies and boost their odds of reaching a settlement.
By providing certainty to the other side, more concessions can be demanded at the nego-
tiating table.
EU engagement and counterfactuals in Cyprus
Could the EU have incentivised Greek Cypriots to unilaterally endorse the Annan frame-
work in 2002–2003?A frequent critique of the Cyprus referendum is that EU accession was
already secured by the time of the referendum, and therefore Greek Cypriots had no
immediate incentive to vote ‘yes’. This line of thought implies that a segment of the Greek
Cypriot electorate particularly in the left rejected the plan, hoping for an improved
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settlement.14 The timing of the referendum after accession was effectively secured and the
lack of a firm endorsement of the Greek Cypriot leadership were arguably the worst
decisions made by the UN during the Cyprus mediations of 2002–2004.
Admittedly, it is hard to know what would have happened, if Turkish Cypriots had
agreed on a settlement in the decade preceding accession. Nonetheless, had a mandate
referendum been considered earlier, the Cyprus Problem would have had a reasonable
chance of ratification with a majority vote in the Greek Cypriot community. Admittedly,
polls in the 2002–2003 period indicate widespread scepticism and large fluctuations in
public opinion, but at this time, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not significantly different
in their attitudes towards the Annan Plan.15 According to a poll in February 2003, 50 per
cent of both sides opposed the Plan,16 while a year earlier, 54 per cent of Greek Cypriots
supported it17 (incidentally, a percentage close to early predictions for the 1992 South
African referendum).
Following the December 2012 Copenhagen Summit and informal accession of Cyprus to
the EU, both Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis
enjoyed unprecedented support in the Cypriot polls (82.6 and 85.6 per cent, respectively).18
Another poll right before the February 2003 elections indicated that Greek Cypriots saw
Clerides as ‘the most competent to handle the Cyprus problem’.19 The polls imply that had
he considered a referendum earlier, he could have possibly prevented the AKEL-
Papadopoulos alliance which led to the election of Papadopoulos as President in 2003.
While Papadopoulos used his position to demonise the Annan Plan,20 Clerides was willing
and capable to steer public opinion in favour of the settlement with the strong backing of
the Greek government, particularly if additional concessions were made to Greek Cypriots
in return for their ‘unilateral endorsement’ of the Plan. Such concessions might have
reduced Turkish Cypriots support below the 65 per cent level it enjoyed in 2004, but a
majority vote for the Plan in both communities would have been conceivable.At the time,
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were refusing to support the Plan, but a compromise might
have been possible by 2004,whenTurkish Cypriots andTurkey changed their policies. Since
the latter still rejected the plan in 2002–2003, an alternative option would have been to
‘lock’ the Greek Cypriot side earlier into endorsing an ‘improved Annan Plan’ through a
mandate referendum.
Inevitably, as internal referendums target only one of the many communities in a
conflict, it is easier to initially commit only one community to holding a referendum during
a particular moment in the negotiation process. Each community might have its own
peculiarities, needs and preferred timing in addressing its domestic constituencies. In fact,
only weeks before the April 2004 referendum, the undecided AKEL leadership finally
pointed to the timing issue and asked the UN to postpone the referendum. Interviews in
Cyprus suggest that AKEL actually considered abstaining from the 2004 vote to minimise
the damage that would be caused by an overwhelming negative outcome, aiming to initiate
another referendum vote once constituencies were less polarised.21 Indeed, Greek Cypriot
public opinion appeared to have shifted in favour of a compromise by 2008 following the
victory ofAKEL’s Demetris Christofias; then in 2013, the main advocate of theAnnan Plan,
Nikos Anastasiades, won the presidential elections with the largest popular mandate for a
Cypriot president in decades.And speaking with the wisdom of hindsight, members of the
UN team in Cyprus told the author that it was a mistake not to encourage Christofias to run
242 NEOPHYTOS LOIZIDES
© 2014 The Author. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
European Consortium for Political Research
a South African-style mandate referendum shortly after making the first breakthroughs in
bi-communal negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot community in 2009.22
Conclusions
Overall, the study of peace referendums offers an important addition to academic and
public policy literature, particularly as the international community is currently debating
even advocating the efficacy of referendums in conflict-ridden societies around the globe
(Goddard 2013). For instance in 2013, the Israeli government took a new law to the Knesset
requiring that all territorial concessions be ratified by voters in a special referendum
(Goddard 2013), while Colombia’s congress approved a referendum to seal an eventual
peace deal with the country’s FARC rebels.23 Moreover, peace referendums have been
debated in the past decades among other places in Sri Lanka (Edrisinha 1998), Western
Sahara (Zunes & Mundy 2010), Abyei (Johnson 2008), Nagorno-Karabakh (Johansson
2009) and Kashmir (Bose 2007) potentially affecting the future of some of the world’s most
volatile geopolitical regions. The findings of this article are even more relevant for those
conflicts around the globe where referendum options have not entered the public debate
yet and, as a result, leaders aiming for a negotiated settlement have more flexibility in
deciding among the various alternatives suggested here.24
Leadership is of critical importance in contested peace processes. South Africa and
Cyprus suggest how leaders could either mobilise voters for peace or alternatively frame
potentially promising peace settlements as catastrophic. Another example is President
Charles De Gaulle in France, who held a pre-referendum on the self-determination of
Algeria in 1961. In an intense political campaign, including three nationally broadcast
speeches, he threatened to resign if his proposal to continue negotiations was defeated.Like
De Klerk, he used his personal leverage to promote a settlement. De Gaulle warned the
public that ‘a weak or negative response would cause the downfall of much he had achieved
and trigger renewed subversion and political instability’ (Lustick 1993: 289). He received a
massive 72 per cent ‘yes’ vote and proceeded to implement his policies to negotiate with
Algerians, sidelining army radicals and pied-noir resistance in the process.
As this article concludes, timing and early consultation with the public are also
extremely important. Besides Cyprus and South Africa there are other examples. For
instance, the 1998 referendum on the contested issue of granting citizenship to Russian-
speakers in Latvia took place years before the country’s accession to the EU (Morris 2004).
Likewise, in the case of Northern Ireland’s mostly post-settlement referendum, constructive
ambiguities in the agreement offered stakeholders (including London and Dublin) the
mandate to implement the agreement and redesign provisions as necessary, thus safeguard-
ing the agreement from any subsequent reversals in public preferences.
Of course, it is hard to predict what would have happened to Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin had he initiated a referendum for the Oslo I Accord in 1993. Rabin ignored
protests and relied exclusively on slim support from the Knesset (also dependent upon
Arab voters) (Haklai 2003). Rabin could have likely defeated his opponents in a referen-
dum and won the mandate to proceed with a comprehensive settlement as polls suggested
that 53 per cent of the electorate supported the Oslo Agreement in late August 1993
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(Waxman 2013). However, even if he had won the referendum, religious extremists would
have argued that no one has the right to concede territory as Israel is God-given and
beyond the decisions of people at a certain time and place (Haklai 2003; Waxman 2013).
Nonetheless, even in the case of Israel, an informal mandate referendum might have been
a safer instrument for mediation than a post-settlement one, even when it had failed. For
example in the case of the failed 2004 Gaza referendum among Likud party members,Ariel
Sharon opted to ignore his party and the (unofficial) negative outcome (Shamir 2007). Such
responses might be more difficult in the future for Israeli leaders, given existing or newly
proposed legally binding referendum clauses legislated in the Knesset.
In a bid to assist relevant future academic and policy research, I offer in this article a
number of possible referendum designs, noting both their positive and problematic aspects.
On the one hand, the design and timing of referendums could lead to successful outcomes
in peace processes despite conditions that predict otherwise, as in the case of SouthAfrica.
On the other hand, poorly designed referendums and/or poor timing could inflame already
unstable situations or lead to continuous stalemates as in Cyprus.Although adopting a set
of fixed recommendations is not a good idea, mandate referendums have a great deal to
offer.By securing early approval of a settlement in the form of conditional or unconditional
mandates, leaders can incentivise a subsequent peace process. Mandate referendums are
more likely to succeed in the first place and once successful, they could extend the durabil-
ity of the peace process for the long-term future.Overall, prior endorsement of a settlement
by the public could sustain peace in difficult times, especially during unavoidable reversals
in public opinion.
Mandate referendums are not risk-free (particularly if polls are indecisive) yet such risks
are unavoidable if referendums are already dictated by normative, constitutional or politi-
cal necessities. Often taking a risk is necessary to move a political process forward. But as
most experts and advisors to De Klerk have pointed out, the South African mandate
referendum allowed the South African leader to take calculated risks rather than face a
volatile and uncertain future.25 An alternative option, of course, is for policy makers to
avoid referendums at all costs, hoping that the subsequent implementation of the settle-
ment will increase public legitimacy through normal electoral process. But in cases where
referendums are already promised or nearly decided due to legal/constitutional provisions,
mandate referendums should be part of available options familiar to specialists.
The article extends Putnam’s influential work on ratification processes to the study of
peace referendums.Although it builds on his two-level game theory model, it departs from
his emphasis on domestic politics as a constraint in international negotiations. By way of
contrast, it makes a contribution to the relevant literature by identifying a missing link in
Putnam’s theorising through which domestic politics could create positive opportunities for
peace settlements. The South African case demonstrates how participation fosters social
learning, leading to more creative solutions to seemingly intractable conflicts.26 Overall, by
treating domestic constituencies as a resource rather than a constraint, leaders could
maximise their available pathways for positive transformation.
The broader literature and debates on violent conflict in emerging democracies could
gain significant insights from this analysis as well (Paris 2004; Mansfield & Snyder 2005;
Jarstad & Sisk 2008). For scholars and practitioners advocating unqualified support for
democratisation, this study suggests that benign intentions should not be a substitute for the
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proper strategising and timing of democratic initiatives, including popular referendums.As
some form of public ratification of peace processes might be unavoidable due to legal,
constitutional or normative considerations, governments and international organisations
should consider ‘least destructive’ (even potentially promising) institutional options such as
mandate referendums. Moreover, for those interested in leadership studies, the analysis
suggests pathways and linkages through which visionary and determined leaders could
calculate their risks and put forward a successful peace agenda. As demonstrated in this
article, leaders often hold the key in securing the passage of a peace referendum.
While cautioning against adopting a fixed set of recommendations, the article highlights
the multiple advantages of securing advance mandates in peace negotiations. Questioning
the absence of relevant academic and policy literature on the topic, it demonstrates how
governments and international organisations frequently propose and implement referen-
dums in conflict-prone societies without systematically observing past failures and suc-
cesses. Future research could identify relevant applications of these concepts not only in
peace-building operations, but also in international mediations on issues of major global
concern, such as humanitarian intervention, global warming and the sovereign debt crisis (a
highly timely issue for Cyprus and other countries in the eurozone crisis). Consistent
failures in addressing potentially catastrophic challenges in world politics suggest the need
for novel institutional designs in international mediations in general and peace processes
more specifically.
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Notes
1. For notable exceptions, see Trumbore (1998); Hancock (2001a, 2011b); Shamir and Shikaki (2005); Schultz
(2005); Simeon (2009).
2. See interviews with key colleagues and advisors of De Klerk, current president of his foundation David Steward
(2012) and Dawid de Villiers (2012), former member of De Klerk’s cabinet, who advised De Klerk on the
necessity of initiating a referendum.
3. For background information on various referendum case studies mentioned in this article, as well as the designs
and specific wording of referendum questions, see Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, available online at:
www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/CentrefortheStudyofEthnicConflict/TeachingResearch/Datasets
4. BBC, 22 February 1992, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
5. See interview with Mattes (2012a) and Mattes (2012b).
6. IPS-Inter Press Service, 18 March 1992, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
7. See earlier response to the white farmers’ referendum inANC (1999); see also landmark debate on the referendum
in Proceedings of the House of Assembly of South Africa, Friday, 28 February 1992, pp. 1962–1986.
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND PEACE REFERENDUMS 245
© 2014 The Author. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
European Consortium for Political Research
8. Proceedings of the House of Assembly of South Africa, Friday, 28 February 1992, p. 1954; see also interviews
with Steward (2012) and De Villiers (2012).
9. The ANC encouraged and maintained white representation even though Mandela was initially ambivalent and
distrustful of the role of whites in the movement (Ross 2009). In fact, the successor of De Klerk’s party, the New
National Party, was eventually incorporated into the ANC in 2005, although the majority of white voters
switched their allegiance to the Democratic Alliance – a party that traces its roots back to the anti-apartheid
movement. See interview with De Jager (2012).
10. Unlike South Africa which had a very developed polling sector (see Mattes 2012b), the UN did not run polls
before making this decision while three subsequent polls in 2004 reported by Greek Cypriot dailies showed 62
per cent (Phileleftheros), 53 per cent (Politis) and 54.3 per cent (Simerini) vote against the Plan; all reported a
large margin of undecided voters among Greek Cypriots (Agence France Presse, 7 March 2004, accessed
through Nexis, 29 October 2013).
11. See also the Phileleftheros newspaper interview with former Attorney General Alekos Markides (2004) and
CYBC debate with AKEL’s constitutional expert Toumazos Tselepis (2004). See also Republic of Cyprus
parliamentary debates for 15 July 2007.
12. Apart from criticising the Annan Plan for consolidating partition, critics including President Papadopoulos have
focused their campaign on the absence of guarantees for implementation particularly with regard to returning
land (Christophorou 2005).
13. Interview with Quintin Oliver (2009); see also Hancock (2011b).
14. Following the April 2004 referendum, Cyprus formally joined the EU but the membership benefits applied
primarily to the Greek-Cypriot-controlled portion of the island. For discussions on EU conditionality, see
Richmond (2005); Rumelili (2007); Tocci (2007) and Diez et al. (2008).
15. In contrast to the South Africa case, until after the Annan Plan there have been few reliable surveys in Cyprus.
A notable exception is the recent UN Development Programme (UNDP)-funded surveys conducted by the
Cyprus2015 Initiative, available online at: http://cyprus2015.org
16. Agence France Presse, 15 February 2003, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
17. EU Observer, 17 November 2002, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
18. Athens News Agency, 15 December 2002, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
19. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 February 2003, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
20. On the issue of Papadopoulos’ leadership role in the 2004 referendum, Christophorou (2005: 100) cites opinion
polls which indicate that ‘more citizens were ready to base their vote on the President’s views than on the advice
of their party’.
21. See interview with Quintin Oliver (2009), who also served as an advisor for the European Commission during
the Cyprus referendum in 2004; interview with leftist academic Nikos Trimikliniotis (2009).
22. See briefing with the UN Cyprus Mission (2011).
23. BBC, 25 October 2013, accessed through Nexis, 29 October 2013.
24. A case in point is the Ivanishvili administration in the Republic of Georgia, committed to reaching out to the
breakaway region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as improving relations with the Russian Federation
despite opposition within the country, including its own ‘Dream Coalition’ (personal communication with
advisors and members of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Ivanishvili, Tbilisi, 2013).
25. See interviews with De Villiers (2012), Mattes (2012a) and Steward (2012).
26. This issue also appears in discussions of citizen involvement to improve the implementation of policy as well
as transparency and accountability (Papadopoulos & Warin 2007; Newig & Fritsch 2009).
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